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Issues to be Validated
RA Downlink improves
“local” Situation Awareness?
? No contradicting clearances;
? Traffic information;
? Post-conflict traffic planning.






? Unclear pilot-controller responsibility.
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Mid-Air
Collision
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• Combination of 1 and 2
• High VS level-off
• False RA
RADE-1 ‚backward‘ Validation RADE-2 ‚forward‘ Validation
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RADE-1* Methodology
• Participants
? 30 area controllers mixed in operational experience
• Set Up
? Observation of 15 traffic scenarios 
? Based on real RAs
? Supplemented with R/T and additional background traffic   
* Full report available at: 
http://www.eurocontrol.int/ra-downlink/rade-1.html
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RADE-1 – Aims
• Gather controller feedback about operational usefulness 
of RA downlink, through questionnaires and interviews.
• Explore interface options
• Assess and measure controller reaction to RA display
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HMI Solutions
• Options investigated
? Visual Alert but no indication of RA sense
? Visual Alert plus indication of exact RA sense
? Visual/Auditory/Haptic Alert plus indication of exact RA 
sense
• Derived HMI Design Guiding Principles
? RA information on the screen should not pose too 
high demands on the controller’s attentional
resources. 
? The controller needs to be immediately aware of 
whether an RA yields a deviation from the cleared 
flight path or not. 
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Situation Awareness
• Measurements
? Post-exercise RA memory probe
? Post-exercise Subjective Questionnaire (SASHA-Q)
? Eye-Point-Of-Gaze 
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Results (cont’d) 
• Subjective Situational Awareness rating collected after 
each scenario did not reveal any significant positive or 
negative effects of RA downlink.
• Eye tracking measurements did not point to unusual 
‘attention capture’ to RA downlink icon at the expense of 
other traffic display information.
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Controller acceptance:
• The majority of participants saw clear operational 
benefits in the provision of RA information to the 
controller.
• If RA downlink is faster and more reliable than a pilot 
report, it can support controller’s anticipation of 
aircraft manoeuvres.
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In order to realise benefits of RA downlink, two 
requirements need to be met: 
• RA information on the screen should not pose too high 
demands on the controller’s attention. In particular, 
the controller needs to be immediately aware of 
whether an RA yields a deviation from the cleared 
flight path or not. 
• Operational procedures for the use of RA information 
need to be defined. 
Results (cont’d) 
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Conclusion
Results of RADE-1 were promising to 
proceed with the RADE-2 “forward”
validation approach.
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RADE-2 Aims
• Evaluation of an RA Downlink Operational Concept.
• Obtain empirical data on controller reaction (performance, 
acceptance) in a realistic interactive simulation scenario 
setting involving an RA encounter.
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– Correct and timely
– Delayed (RA report after the COC).
• Controller Position 
– Executive
– Planner
• Manipulated in a 2 * 2 * 2 experimental design resulting in 
a total of 8 simulation runs.
• The participants are not informed in advance which pilot 
report condition will be used.
• Experimental run order is different for each group.
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RA Generation
• The aim is to generate or facilitate RAs in a realistic and 
non-intrusive way. 
This is achieved by:
• Predicting controller’s actions.




• Varying aircraft behaviour.
• Sector characteristics.
• Similar call signs.
• Repeated attempts on the same aircraft or using the same 
method are avoided (as controllers find this annoying).
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Successful Run Criteria
• Experimental run is deemed successful if an operationally 
realistic RA occurs.
• Once the RA occurs the scenario is terminated after 2-3 
minutes.
• Immediately after the RA, probing questions are asked to 
assess controller’s Situational Awareness.
• A run will be declared unsuccessful if:
? No RA has occurred after 50 min.
? The RA is deemed unrealistic
? Realism of simulation has been lost for whatever reason
? Technical failures
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Controller Error
• Incorrect clearance or instruction.
• Undetected incorrect read-back.
Facilitating Methods for the SME:
• Increase workload by requesting a change of flight level or 
by requesting direct routing as often as realistic. 
• Incorrect read-back.
• Read-back from the other airplane (using callsign 
similarity).
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Pilot Error
• Level bust.
• Turn instead of level change or vice versa (e.g. heading 310 
instead of level 310).
• Any other non-compliance with ATC instructions/clearances. 
Facilitating Methods for the SME:
• Pilot disobeys the clearance.
• Pilot selects a path along a wrong route.
• Slow pilot response 
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High Vertical Rate Level-off
• RA caused by high vertical speed prior to level-off 1000 feet 
apart from other aircraft.
Facilitating Methods for the SME:
• Instruct the pilot to manipulate the vertical rate.
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Imminent Conflict 
When a situation that potentially may result in an RA:
• Pilots may delay response to any calls from the controller.
• Pilots may distract the controller attention by making a call 
from an aircraft not involved in the potential conflict.
• SME Coordinator will create heavy coordination workload 
on the planning controller.
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RA Generation Guideline
• Controllers are exposed to the situations in which, despite 
their best efforts, conflict and RAs will occur.
• Controller confidence might be shaken. 
? Controllers must not be placed in the position when 
they have to justify themselves.
? We never judge controller performance.
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Measurements
Situation Awareness
? Post-exercise RA memory probe
? Post-exercise Subjective Questionnaire (SASHA-Q)
? Situation Awareness online probe
? Post-exercise debriefing
? replay with/without RA downlink display
? think-aloud protocol  
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Other Measurements 
• Workload
? NASA-TLX subjective workload rating
? Late transfers (embedded secondary task workload 
index)
• Controller Acceptance
? Simulation realism (post-exercise debriefing)
? Operational Concept (post-experiment debriefing, final 
debriefing)
? Replay with/without RA downlink display
? Think-aloud protocol
• Simulation recordings  
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Objective Measurements
• The number of instances:
? when a controller issued an instruction to an aircraft 
with an RA.
? when a controller gave traffic information to involved 
aircraft (i.e. aircraft with RA and third-party aircraft), 
as well as the quality of this traffic information.
? of follow-up conflicts involving third-party aircraft and 
RA aircraft after RA manoeuvres.
• Number and severity of conflicts (in terms of spacing) that 
triggered RA events.
• Controllers’ response times to pilot requests following an 
RA (unrelated to the RA situation).
• Average latency of RA display on CWP.
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Simulation Realism (preliminary)
Group 3Group 2Group 1
Pilot response to RA realistic
RA event realistic




Scale: 1 (not at all) to 5 (absolutely)
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